Louisiana Forestry Association v. Secretary United States Depart by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-5-2014 
Louisiana Forestry Association v. Secretary United States Depart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Louisiana Forestry Association v. Secretary United States Depart" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 149. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/149 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-4030 
____________          
                                            
LOUISIANA FORESTRY ASSOCIATION INC.; 
OUTDOOR AMUSEMENT BUSINESS ASSOCIATION 
INC.; CRAWFISH PROCESSORS ALLIANCE; FOREST 
RESOURCES ASSOCIATION INC.; AMERICAN HOTEL 
& LODGING ASSOCIATION; AMERICAN SUGAR 
CANE LEAGUE OF USA INC., 
 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR; JANE OATES, in her official capacity as United 
States Assistant Secretary of Labor Employment and Training 
Administration; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF 
LABOR; SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF HOMELAND SECURITY; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
____________                          
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-07687) 
District Judge: Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
 2 
 
___________                         
 
Argued May 31, 2013 
 
Before:    JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges, and 
RAKOFF,
*
 District Judge. 
 
(Filed: February 5, 2014) 
 
R. Wayne Pierce, Esq. [ARGUED] 
Pierce Law Firm 
Suite 106 
133 Defense Highway 
Annapolis, MD 21401 
  
Veronica W. Saltz, Esq. 
Saltz Matkov  
998 Old Eagle School Road 
Suite 1206 
Wayne, PA 19087 
 
Leon R. Sequeira, Esq. 
Seyfarth Shaw 
975 F Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20004 
Counsel for Appellants 
 
Geoffrey Forney, Esq. [ARGUED]   
United States Department of Justice 
                                              
 
*
  Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior Judge of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
sitting by designation. 
 3 
 
Office of Immigration Litigation  
Room 6223  
450 5th Street, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20001 
 
Harry L. Sheinfeld, Esq. 
United States Department of Labor 
Office of the Solicitor 
Room N-2101 
200 Constitution Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC 20210 
 Counsel for Appellees 
 
Arthur N. Read, Esq.  
Friends of Farmworkers, Inc.  
42 South 15th Street 
Suite 605 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
 
Meredith B. Stewart, Esq.  
Southern Poverty Law Center 
1055 Saint Charles Avenue  
Suite 505  
New Orleans, LA 70130 
 
Sarah M. Claassen, Esq.  
Elizabeth D. Mauldin, Esq.  
Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, Inc.  
519 North Charles Street  
Suite 260  
Baltimore, MD 21201  
 
Edward J. Tuddenham, Esq. [ARGUED]     
 4 
 
228 West 137th Street 
New York, NY 10030 
Counsel for Intervenors 
___________                      
 
OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.  
 Appellants, a group of associations representing 
employers in non-agricultural industries, claim that the 
Department of Labor exceeded its authority by enacting a 
regulation governing the calculation of the minimum wage a 
U.S. employer must offer in order to recruit foreign workers 
under the H-2B visa program.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment for the Department of Labor and its co-
defendants, the Secretary of Labor, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Homeland Security.  
Having concluded that the regulation was validly 
promulgated, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
 On January 19, 2011, the Department of Labor (the 
“DOL”) issued a new regulation governing the calculation of 
the minimum wage a U.S. employer must offer in order to 
recruit foreign workers as part of the H-2B visa program, 
which permits U.S. employers to recruit foreign workers to 
fill unskilled, non-agricultural positions that no qualified U.S. 
worker will accept.  See Wage Methodology for the 
Temporary Non-agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 76 
Fed. Reg. 3,452 (Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 
655.10) (the “2011 Wage Rule”).  In September 2011, 
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Appellants—a group of associations representing employers 
in non-agricultural industries which recruit H-2B workers and 
stand to face higher labor costs as a result of the 2011 Wage 
Rule
1—challenged the validity of the 2011 Rule by initiating 
an action against the Department of Labor, the Department of 
Homeland Security, and the Secretaries of the respective 
agencies.  Also party to this appeal is a group of individuals 
and organizations representing foreign and U.S. workers 
impacted by the H-2B program (“the Intervenors”).2  The 
Intervenors were plaintiffs in a prior suit that successfully 
challenged the 2008 Wage Rule, the predecessor to the 2011 
Wage Rule. 
A. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
1. The H-2B Visa Program 
 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
established the modern framework for regulation of 
immigration in the United States, including provisions for the 
admission of permanent and temporary foreign workers.  See 
                                              
 
1
  The five appellants are the Louisiana Forestry 
Association, Inc.; Outdoor Amusement Business Association, 
Inc.; Forest Resource Association, Inc.; American Hotel and 
Lodging Association; and American Sugar Cane League of 
U.S.A., Inc.  
 
 
2
  The eight intervenors are Jahamel Abuleche, 
Romulo Abuleche, Comite Apoyo de los Trabajadores 
Agricolas, Mark Cunanan, Salvador Martinez Barrera, 
Pineros Campesinos Unidos del Noroeste, Jesus Vite Lopez, 
and the Alliance of Forest Workers and Harvesters.  
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), Pub. L. 
No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101 et seq.).  One such provision was the H-2 visa program, 
which governed the recruitment of unskilled foreign workers 
for agricultural and non-agricultural jobs.  Id. § 
101(a)(15)(H)(ii).  In 1986, Congress enacted the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”), 
which amended the INA by, among other things, bifurcating 
the H-2 visa program into the H-2A and H-2B programs, 
which govern the admission of agricultural and non-
agricultural workers, respectively.  See Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 
301(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3411 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b)).  Named for the statutory section 
under which it was created, the H-2B program permits U.S. 
employers to recruit and hire temporary unskilled, non-
agricultural workers from abroad to fill positions that no 
qualified U.S. worker will accept.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (stating that U.S. employers may hire 
an individual “having residence in a foreign country which he 
has no intention of abandoning who is coming temporarily to 
the United States to perform other temporary service or labor 
if unemployed persons capable of performing such service or 
labor cannot be found in this country . . . .”). 
 Congress initially charged the Attorney General of the 
United States with implementing the INA, including the 
provisions of the Act governing the H-2 visa program.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1).  In 2002, Congress abolished the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), see 6 U.S.C. 
§ 291, and transferred jurisdiction to enforce and administer 
the nation’s immigration laws from the Attorney General to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.  See 6 U.S.C. §§ 202, 
557.  Thus the authority to determine nonimmigrant visa 
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petitions now rests with the Bureau of Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, an agency within the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”).  See id. § 271(b). 
 The authority to administer the H-2B program is 
vested in the DHS pursuant to section 1184(c) of the INA, 
which directs that “[t]he question of any alien as a 
nonimmigrant under 8 U.S.C. § 1005(a)(15)(H) shall be 
determined by the [DHS] after consultation with appropriate 
agencies of the Government, upon petition of the importing 
employer.”  8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1).3  The DHS has by 
regulation designated the DOL as the agency from which it 
seeks “advice” in determining whether to grant H-2B visa 
petitions.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii) (2013).  Specifically, the 
DHS requires an employer seeking an H-2B visa to first 
“apply for a temporary labor certification with the Secretary 
of Labor” prior to filing the visa petition.  Id. § 
214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A).  The regulation further provides that 
“[t]he labor certification shall be advice to the director [of the 
DHS] on [1] whether or not United States workers capable of 
performing the temporary services or labor are available and 
[2] whether or not the alien’s employment will adversely 
affect the wages and working conditions of similarly 
employed United States workers.”  Id.  In other words, the 
DOL’s temporary labor certifications advise the DHS whether 
two of the INA’s several statutory requirements for issuance 
of an H-2B visa have been satisfied.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).  The DHS has also by regulation 
                                              
 
3
  For the reasons explained above, all statutory 
references to the “Attorney General” in this context are now 
deemed to refer to the Secretary of Homeland Security. See 6 
U.S.C. § 557. 
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endowed the DOL with the authority to create the procedures 
necessary to fulfill its charge of issuing labor certifications: 
The secretary of labor shall 
separately establish for the 
temporary labor program under 
his or her jurisdiction, by 
regulation at 20 CFR [§] 655, 
procedures for administering th[e] 
temporary labor program . . . and 
shall determine the prevailing 
wage applicable to an application 
for temporary labor certification 
for that temporary labor program 
in accordance with the Secretary 
of Labor’s regulation at 20 CFR 
[§] 655.10. 
8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(D).  The DHS has explained that it 
“must seek advice from the [DOL] under the H-2B 
classification because the statute requires a showing that 
unemployed U.S. workers are not available to perform the 
services before a petition can be approved.  The [DOL] is the 
appropriate agency of the Government to make such a labor 
market finding.”  Temporary Alien Workers Seeking 
Classification Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 55 
Fed. Reg. 2,606, 2,617 (Jan. 26, 1990) (to be codified at 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)). 
 In sum, the process for obtaining an H-2B visa 
proceeds in two general stages.  First, an employer must 
obtain a temporary labor certification from the DOL.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A).  This requires the employer to 
apply to the DOL for a prevailing wage determination for the 
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area of intended employment.  See 20 C.F.R. § 655.10.  The 
DOL then calculates the prevailing wage based upon 
pertinent regulations, e.g., the 2008 or 2011 Wage Rules.  Id.  
The employer must also submit a work order with the state 
workforce agency serving the geographical area of intended 
employment and advertise the position at a wage equal to or 
higher than the prevailing wage as determined by the DOL.  
Id.  Once these conditions have been satisfied, the DOL will 
issue the labor certification, which serves as the DOL’s 
verification that the employer has demonstrated that “there is 
an insufficient number of U.S. workers who are qualified and 
who will be available for the job opportunity for which 
certification is sought and that the employment of the H-2B 
workers will not adversely affect the benefits, wages, and 
working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.”  Id. 
§ 655.50(b).  Only after the DOL issues the labor certification 
may an employer proceed to the second stage of the process: 
filing an H-2B visa application with the DHS.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(6)(iii)(C), (E).  Although the DOL’s labor 
certification is a prerequisite to obtaining an H-2B visa 
petition, the authority to grant or deny an H-2B visa petition 
ultimately rests with the DHS alone. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c). 
2.  The DOL’s Historical Role in the Administration of the H-
2B Program 
 The DOL has played a role in the administration of the 
nation’s immigration laws in general, and the admission of 
foreign workers in particular, since the Department’s 
inception in 1913.  At the time the DOL was established, the 
Department “housed the Bureau of Immigration and the 
Bureau of Naturalization,” and “[a]s early as 1917, the 
Secretary of Labor and the Bureau of Immigration, then part 
of the DOL, worked together to manage the importation of 
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laborers into the United States.”  La. Forestry Ass’n v. Solis, 
889 F. Supp. 2d 711, 716 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citations 
omitted).  The Bureaus of Immigration and Naturalization 
merged in 1933 to form the INS, which remained part of the 
DOL until 1940 when it was transferred to the Department of 
Justice.  Id. 
 The INS has long required employers seeking to admit 
workers under the H-2 program to first obtain “a certification 
from the Secretary of Labor or his designated representative 
stating that qualified persons in the United States are not 
available and that the employment policies of the [DOL] have 
been observed . . . .”   Miscellaneous Amendments, 31 Fed. 
Reg. 4,446 (Mar. 16, 1966) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 214.2).  In 
1968, pursuant to these provisions, the DOL formally issued 
regulations of its own governing the certification process for 
the first time.  See Certification of Temporary Foreign Labor 
for Industries Other than Agriculture or Logging, 33 Fed. 
Reg. 7,570–71 (May 22, 1968) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 621).  
In later years, the DOL amended the regulations governing 
the certification process.  See, e.g., Labor Certification 
Process, 43 Fed. Reg. 10,306 (Mar. 10, 1978) (codified in 
scattered sections of 20 C.F.R.). 
 The DOL continued its role in the administration of 
both the H-2A and H-2B visa programs after Congress’s 
passage of the IRCA bifurcated the H-2 program in 1986.  
Although the IRCA was silent as to the DOL’s rulemaking 
authority concerning the H-2B program,
4
 see IRCA § 301(a), 
                                              
 
4
  By contrast, Congress expressly granted DOL 
limited rulemaking authority over the H-2A program.  See 
IRCA § 301(b) (“Section 214(c) (8 U.S.C. 1184(c)) is 
amended by adding at the end the following: ‘For purposes of 
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the INS and its successor, the DHS, continued to authorize 
the DOL’s involvement pursuant to their own agency 
regulations.  See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h).  During the first 
two decades of the H-2B program’s existence, the DOL 
issued, without notice and comment, a series of General 
Administration Letters governing the determination of the 
prevailing wage rate for the H-2B program.  See, e.g., Interim 
Prevailing Wage Policy for Nonagricultural Immigration 
Programs, Gen Admin. Ltr., No. 4-95 (Dep’t of Labor May 
18, 1995), available at 
http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/GAL4-95_attach.pdf.  
In sum, these letters set the prevailing wage at the rate 
negotiated under a governing collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”), or, if no CBA existed, the rate as determined under 
the Davis-Bacon Act (“DBA”), 40 U.S.C. §§ 3141 et seq., or 
McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (“SCA”), 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 6701 et seq.  See id. at 1–2.  In the event that no CBA, 
DBA, or SCA wage rate was available, the prevailing wage 
was determined by wage surveys.  Id. at 2.  In 1998, the DOL 
first used the Occupational Employment Statistics (“OES”) 
survey as the source for determining the prevailing wage 
where no CBA, DBA, or SCA rate existed.  See Prevailing 
Wage Policy for Nonagricultural Immigration Programs, Gen. 
Admin. Ltr., No. 2-98 (Dep’t of Labor Oct. 31, 1997), 
available at http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/GAL2-
98_attach.pdf.  During this time, the DOL also began to 
consider “skill level” in determining the prevailing wage, 
classifying H-2B employment opportunities as either “entry 
                                                                                                     
this subsection with respect to nonimmigrants described in 
section 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), the term ‘appropriate agencies of 
Government’ means the Department of Labor and includes 
the Department of Agriculture.’”). 
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level” or “experienced level” and considering the skill level 
of an occupation as one of several factors affecting the 
prevailing wage rate for that job.  See Gen. Admin. Ltr. 4-95, 
at 5–6. 
 The DOL abandoned the two-tier approach in 2005 
and instead adopted the wage calculation methodology used 
in administering the H-1B program, which governs the 
temporary admission of aliens in skilled, specialty 
occupations.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b).  Under the 
H-1B program’s wage calculation regime, the prevailing 
wage is determined by a four-tier system based on the skill 
level required for the occupation.
5
  See id. § 1182(p)(4).  The 
                                              
5
  The H-1B program’s four-tier system for 
determining the prevailing wage is set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(p)(4), which provides: 
 
Where the Secretary of Labor 
uses, or makes available to 
employers, a governmental survey 
to determine the prevailing wage, 
such survey shall provide at least 
4 levels of wages commensurate 
with experience, education, and 
the level of supervision.  Where 
an existing government survey 
has only 2 levels, 2 intermediate 
levels may be created by dividing 
by 3, the difference between the 2 
levels offered, adding the quotient 
thus obtained to the first level and 
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DOL first applied the four-tier methodology to the H-2B visa 
program in a 2005 letter, which, like its predecessors, was 
issued without notice and comment.  See  Mem. To SWA 
Adm’rs from Emily Stover DeRocco, Asst. Sec’y for Emp’t 
& Training, Revised Prevailing Wage Determination 
Guidance (May 17, 2005).  “That letter also announced that in 
the absence of a CBA, the DOL would use the OES program 
as the main source of data for establishing prevailing wages.”  
Id. 
 In 2008, for the first time since the 1960s, the DOL 
promulgated a regulation governing the labor certification 
process through notice and comment rulemaking.  See Labor 
Certification Process and Enforcement for Temporary 
Employment in Occupations Other Than Agriculture (H-2B 
Workers), 73 Fed. Reg. 78,020 (Dec. 19, 2008) (codified at 
20 C.F.R. §§655–56) (the “2008 Wage Rule”).  The 2008 
Wage Rule codified several aspects of the DOL’s guidance in 
the 2005 letter discussed above.  For example, the 2008 Rule 
provided that the four-tier methodology borrowed from the 
H-1B program should be used to calculate the prevailing 
wage.  See id. at 78,020, 78,029, 78,056.  The 2008 Rule 
further required that the prevailing wage be determined by the 
rate specified by the governing CBA, or, in the absence of a 
CBA, “the arithmetic mean . . . of the wages of workers 
similarly employed at the skill level in the area of intended 
employment[,]” as calculated using OES data.  Id. at 78,056.  
The Rule alternatively permitted use of employer surveys to 
establish the prevailing wage, provided certain conditions 
were satisfied.  See id.  
                                                                                                     
subtracting that quotient from the 
second level. 
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3. Subsequent Litigation and Rulemaking 
 In 2009, a group of individuals and organizations 
representing foreign and U.S. workers impacted by the H-2B 
program
6
 initiated an action in the District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging the validity of 
the 2008 Wage Rule.  See Comite de Apoyo a los 
Trabajadores Agricolas v. Solis, No. 09-240, 2010 WL 
3431761 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (“CATA I” or “the CATA 
litigation”).7  The CATA plaintiffs alleged that several 
provisions of the 2008 Wage Rule, including the provision 
governing the calculation of the prevailing wage rate, violated 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 
et seq.  The District Court agreed, holding that the DOL 
violated the APA in promulgating the 2008 Wage Rule by, 
among other things, importing into the H-2B program the H-
1B program’s four-tier wage calculation methodology, and by 
relying on OES data, rather than DBA or SCA data, to set the 
prevailing wage, without subjecting either provision to notice 
and comment.
8
  See id. at *4–7, 19, 25.  Citing concerns that 
                                              
 
6
  As discussed in part I supra, these individuals are 
the Intervenors in this appeal. 
 
 
7
  The CATA litigation, like this case, was originally 
assigned to Judge Pollak.  Both cases were reassigned to 
Judge Davis following Judge Pollak’s death in May 2012.  
   
 
8
  The District Court explained that although “[a]s a 
general matter, of course, DOL’s [2008 Wage Rule] w[as] 
subjected to notice and comment,” the DOL ‘expressly 
refused to consider comments concerning the choice of 
appropriate data sets’ and the four-tier methodology.”  CATA 
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vacating the 2008 Wage Rule would result in a regulatory gap 
and leave the DOL with no method by which to calculate the 
prevailing wage, the District Court ordered the DOL to 
promulgate a replacement rule within 120 days, leaving intact 
the four-tier method until a new regulation was issued.  Id. at 
25.   
 In response to the District Court’s decision, the DOL 
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPRM”) setting 
forth a new method for calculating the prevailing wage.  See 
Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural 
Employment H-2B Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,578 (proposed 
Oct. 5, 2010) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.10) (the 
“Proposed 2011 Wage Rule”).  The Proposed 2011 Wage 
Rule eliminated the four-tier skill-level methodology, and, as 
the NPRM explained, reflected the DOL’s concern that the 
four-tier regime did not produce “the appropriate wage 
necessary to ensure U.S. workers are not adversely affected 
by the employment of H-2B workers.”  Id. at 61,579.  The 
Proposed Rule defined the prevailing wage as “the highest of 
the following: Wages established under an agreed-upon 
[CBA] . . .; a wage rate established under the DBA or SCA 
for that occupation in the area of intended employment; and 
the arithmetic mean wage rate established by the OES for that 
occupation in the area of intended employment.”  Id.  The 
DOL explained that the Proposed Rule would “best achieve 
the Department’s policy objectives of ensuring that wages of 
U.S. workers are more adequately protected and, thus, that 
                                                                                                     
I, 2010 WL 3431761, at *19.  The District Court thus 
concluded that the provisions were “improperly promulgated 
without acceptance and consideration of comments as 
required by the APA.”  Id.  
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employers are only permitted to bring H-2B workers into the 
country where the wages and working conditions of U.S. 
workers will not be adversely affected.”  Id. at 61,581. 
 On January 19, 2011, the DOL published a final 
version of the 2011 Wage Rule, which is the subject of this 
appeal.  See Wage Methodology for the Temporary Non-
agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,452 
(Jan. 19, 2011) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 655.10) (the “2011 
Wage Rule”).  In its final form, the 2011 Wage Rule 
establishes a wage calculation regime wherein the prevailing 
wage is the highest of the applicable CBA; the rate 
established under the DBA or SCA; or the OES mean.  Id. at 
3,453, 3,484.  The 2011 Wage Rule eliminates the four-tier 
methodology from the wage calculation regime “in favor of 
the mean OES wage for each occupational category,” and 
likewise bars the use of employer-submitted surveys if the 
prevailing wage can be determined based on OES data or the 
rates established under the DBA or SCA.  Id.  The notice of 
the final rule provided that the 2011 Wage Rule would take 
effect after a one-year delay, on January 1, 2012.  Id. at 3,452.   
  The DOL relied upon both the INA and DHS 
regulations as the basis for its authority to promulgate the 
2011 Wage Rule.  Specifically, the DOL pointed to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1184(c)(1) and 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6), explaining: 
Section 214(c)(1) of the INA 
requires DHS to consult with 
appropriate agencies before 
approving an H-2B visa petition.  
8 U.S.C. [§] 1184(c)(1).  That 
consultation occurs according to a 
. . . regulatory requirement that an 
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employer first obtain a temporary 
certification from the Secretary of 
Labor (the Secretary) establishing 
that U.S workers capable of 
performing the services or labor 
are not available, and that the 
employment of the foreign 
worker(s) will not adversely affect 
the wages and working conditions 
of similarly employed U.S. 
workers.  8 C.F.R. [§] 
214.2(h)(6). 
The Secretary’s responsibility for 
the H-2B program is carried out 
by two agencies with the 
Department.  Applications for 
labor certification are processed 
by the Office of Foreign Labor 
Certification (OFLC) in the 
Employment and Training 
Administration (ETA), the agency 
to which the Secretary has 
delegated those responsibilities 
described in . . . the H-2B 
regulations.  Enforcement of the 
attestations and assurances made 
by employers in H-2B 
applications for labor certification 
is conducted by the Wage and 
Hour Division (WHD) under 
enforcement authority delegated 
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to it by DHS. 8 U.S.C. [§] 
1184(c)(14)(B). 
Id. at 3,452.  The DOL further noted that according to its 
estimates, “the change in the method of determining wages 
will result in a $4.83 increase in the weighted average hourly 
wage for H-2B workers and similarly employed U.S. 
workers[,]” and a total annual transfer cost of $847.4 million.9  
Id. at 3,469, 3,471.   
 Four months later, the DOL published a notice in the 
Federal Register informing the public that H-2B employers 
would be expected to comply with the new prevailing wage 
rate when it took effect on January 1, 2012.  See Application 
of the Prevailing Wage Methodology in the H-2B Program, 
76 Fed. Reg. 21,036, 21,036–37 (Apr. 14, 2011).  At that 
time, the DOL also published a new appendix to the standard 
H-2B visa application form, which all employers are required 
to sign to obtain a labor certification from the DOL.  See id.; 
see also J.A. 185.  The appendix added a requirement that a 
signatory employer certify that “[t]he offered wage equals or 
exceeds the highest of the most recent prevailing wage that is 
or will be issued by the [DOL] to the employer for the time 
period the work is performed.”  J.A. 185.   
 Although the 2011 Wage Rule was set to take effect on 
January 1, 2012, the CATA plaintiffs-Intervenors successfully 
challenged and accelerated its effective date.  See Comite de 
Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Solis, 2011 WL 
                                              
 
9
  The total annual transfer cost is defined as the total 
additional wages employers participating in the H-2B 
program would be required to pay foreign workers recruited 
under the program.  See 76 Fed. Reg. 3,471. 
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2414555, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 16, 2011) (“CATA II”).  On 
June 16, 2011, the District Court vacated the effective date of 
January 1, 2012, and ordered the DOL to issue a new 
effective date through notice and comment rulemaking.  Id. at 
*5.  After providing the public an opportunity to comment on 
the new date, the DOL issued a final rule accelerating the 
2011 Rule’s effective date to September 30, 2011.  See Wage 
Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural 
Employment H-2B Program; Amendment of Effective Date, 
76 Fed. Reg. 45,667, 45,673 (Aug. 1, 2011).  
 The DOL subsequently postponed implementation of 
the 2011 Wage Rule, however, in response to provisions in 
riders to appropriations bills in which Congress expressly 
defunded implementation of the 2011 Rule.  See, e.g., 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2012, Pub. L. 112-55, 125 Stat. 552, Div. B, Title V § 546 
(2011); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112-
74, 125 Stat. 786, Div. F, Title I § 110 (2011); Continuing 
Appropriations Resolution, 2013, H.J. Res. 117, 112th Cong., 
126 Stat. 1313 (2012); Consolidated and Further Continuing 
Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. 113-6, 127 Stat. 198, Div. 
F, Title 5 (2013).  In the interim, the DOL continued to use 
the 2008 Wage Rule to calculate the prevailing wage for H-
2B visa applications.  Although the DOL readily 
acknowledged that the 2008 Rule was invalid, it was unable 
to enforce the 2011 Wage Rule because, as discussed above, 
Congress continued to renew appropriations bans defunding 
the Rule’s implementation.  Thus, in September 2012, the 
CATA plaintiffs-Intervenors moved to vacate the 2008 Wage 
Rule, and for preliminary and permanent injunctions barring 
its use.     
 20 
 
 On March 21, 2013, the District Court granted the 
requested relief, vacating the provisions of the 2008 Wage 
Rule found to be invalid in its order of August 30, 2010.  See 
Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas v. Solis, 933 
F. Supp. 2d 700 (“CATA III”).  The District Court observed 
that the DOL admitted that the 2008 Wage Rule “is 
procedurally and substantively invalid,” and explained why 
vacatur, which it had deemed inappropriate at the time it 
invalidated provisions of the 2008 Wage Rule in August of 
2010, was now the proper remedy: 
[A]fter the DOL acknowledged 
the 2008 Wage Rule’s defects and 
promulgated an unsuccessful 
replacement rule, the DOL 
stopped entirely in its tracks.  The 
DOL now expresses that it has no 
intention of taking further action 
to bring the DOL’s H-2B labor 
certification into statutory and 
regulatory compliance and instead 
urges that we leave undisturbed a 
rule that this Court found 
procedurally invalid thirty months 
ago and that has since been 
declared substantively invalid by 
the very agency that now urges us 
to leave the Rule in place. 
Id. at 713–14.  The District Court thus granted a permanent 
injunction, and ordered that the 2008 Wage Rule be vacated 
and the DOL “come into compliance within thirty (30) days.”  
Id. at 716.  
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 In response to the District Court’s order vacating the 
2008 Wage Rule, the DOL and the DHS issued a final interim 
rule on April 24, 2013.  See Wage Methodology for the 
Temporary Non-Agricultural Employment H-2B Program, 
Part 2, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,047, 24,047–48 (Apr. 24, 2013) 
(codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 214.2, 655.10) (the “2013 Interim 
Rule”).  Like the 2011 Wage Rule, the 2013 Interim Rule 
eliminates the four-tier wage calculation methodology and 
provides that the prevailing wage will be “the arithmetic 
mean wage established in the OES survey, without the four 
levels.”  Id. at 24,053.  And, like the 2008 and 2011 Wage 
Rules, the Interim Rule permits the prevailing wage to be 
determined by the rate established in a governing CBA.  Id.  
In contrast to the 2011 Wage Rule, however, the Interim Rule 
permits, but does not require, “an employer to use a 
prevailing wage determination based on the DBA or SCA.”  
Id. at 24,054.  The Interim Rule leaves intact the 2008 Wage 
Rule’s provision allowing use of employer-provided surveys 
to calculate the prevailing wage, replacing the 2011 Wage 
Rule’s more stringent provision restricting use of employer 
surveys to only very “limited circumstances.”  Id. at 24,054–
55.  The Departments called for comments from the public 
regarding each of these provisions.  Id. at 24,053–55. 
 As the basis for their respective authority to issue the 
2013 Interim Rule, the Departments cited the INA and DHS 
regulations, explaining: 
Section 214(c)(1) requires DHS to 
consult with “appropriate 
agencies of the Government” 
before adjudicating an H-2B 
petition.  DHS has determined 
that, under this statutory 
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provision, it must consult with 
DOL as part of the process of 
adjudicating H-2B petitions 
because DOL is the agency best 
situated to provide advice 
regarding whether “unemployed 
persons capable of performing 
such service or labor cannot be 
found in this country.”  8 U.S.C. 
[§] 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).  DHS, 
in conjunction with DOL, has 
determined that the best way to 
provide this consultation is by 
requiring the employer . . . prior 
to filing an H-2B petition, to first 
apply for a temporary labor 
certification from the Secretary of 
Labor.  8 CFR [§] 
214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A). 
Id. at 24,048.  The Departments emphasized that the DHS and 
its predecessor, the INS, have consulted with the DOL in 
administering the H-2B program since 1968, and that the 
Rule “contains certain revisions to DHS’s H-2B rule to clarify 
that DHS is the Executive Branch agency charged with 
making determinations regarding eligibility for H-2B 
classification, after consulting with DOL for its advice about 
matters with which DOL has expertise, particularly, in this 
case, questions about the methodology for setting the 
prevailing wage in the H-2B program.”  Id. at 24,048–49.  
The Departments further explained that the 2013 Interim Rule 
was issued “in response to the [District] [C]ourt’s order in 
[CATA III] . . . and to ensure that there is no question that the 
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rule is in effect nationwide in light of other outstanding 
litigation.”  Id. at 24,048. 
 The 2013 Interim Rule was made effective 
immediately, pursuant to the “good cause” exception to the 
APA’s requirement that agency rules be subject to a notice 
and comment period and take effect no sooner than 30 days 
after the final rule is published.  Id. at 24,055–56 (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 553(b)(B), (d)(3)).  According to the supplementary 
information to the Interim Final Rule, as well as the DOL’s 
briefing in this case, the Interim Rule is effective only “on a 
temporary basis,” until the 2011 Wage Rule takes effect.  Id. 
at 24,056; Appellants’ Supp. Br. at 1-5. 
 On August 30, 2013, the DOL issued a rule in which it 
indefinitely delayed the effective date of the 2011 Wage Rule 
“to comply with recurrent legislation that prohibits [the 
Department] from using any funds to implement it, and to 
permit time for consideration of public comments sought in 
conjunction with [the 2013 Interim Final Rule] published 
April 24, 2013, 78 [Fed. Reg.] 24[,]047.”  See Wage 
Methodology for the Temporary Non-Agricultural 
Employment H-2B Program; Delay of Effective Date, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 53,643 (Aug. 30, 2013) (the “Delay Rule”).  The DOL 
noted, however, that: 
If Congress no longer prohibits 
implementation of the 2011 Wage 
Rule, the Department will publish 
a document in the Federal 
Register within 45 days of that 
event apprising the public of the 
status of 20 CFR [§] 655.10 and 
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the effective date of the 2011 
Wage Rule.  
Id. at 53,645.  Under the Department of Labor Appropriations 
Act, 2014, effective January 17, 2014, Congress lifted the 
appropriations ban on the 2011 Wage Rule.  See Pub. L. 113-
76, Div. H, Title I (2014).
10
 
B. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
                                              
 
10
  The parties jointly maintain that this appeal remains 
ripe despite the DOL’s stay of the 2011 Wage Rule.  We 
agree.  This case involves a facial challenge to an 
administrative rule, now fully funded, that the parties expect 
to be implemented swiftly and with a direct and foreseeable 
impact.  Because no further factual development is necessary 
and the remaining issues are purely legal challenges to a 
“final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, the matter is thus “fit[] 
. . . for judicial decision,” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 
136, 149 (1967), abrogated by on other grounds by Califano 
v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).  And because we discern no 
institutional interest in delay, and none is otherwise offered, 
we need not consider hardship to the parties.  See Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier 
Safety Admin., 656 F.3d 580, 586 (citing Sabre, Inc. v. Dep't 
of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).  
Moreover, certain parties to this appeal have expressed in 
concrete terms that delay in our assessment of the Rule’s 
validity constitutes a potentially grievous hardship for 
purposes of business planning and places them in a “very real 
dilemma.”  Abbott Labs, 387 U.S. at 153.  
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 On September 7, 2011, Appellants initiated the present 
action in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Louisiana challenging the validity of the 2011 
Wage Rule on the grounds that it was promulgated in 
violation of both the APA and the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(“RFA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.11  Appellants requested both 
declaratory and injunctive relief.  The CATA plaintiffs-
Intervenors subsequently filed an unopposed motion to 
intervene based on principles of comity.  On December 13, 
2011, the District Court “issued an order transferring venue 
and denying, without prejudice, the [Appellants’] motion for 
a preliminary injunction.”  See La. Forestry Ass’n v. Solis, 
814 F. Supp. 2d 655, 665 (W.D. La. 2011).   
 Upon transfer to the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment.  Appellants presented two primary 
challenges to the 2011 Rule: first, that the DOL lacks 
authority to promulgate legislative rules concerning the H-2B 
program, and second, that even if the DOL has such 
rulemaking authority, the DOL’s violation of certain 
procedural requirements of the APA and RFA invalidates the 
Rule entirely.   
On August 20, 2012, the District Court issued a 
decision and order granting the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.
12
  See La. Forestry Ass’n v. Solis, 889 F. 
                                              
 
11
  Appellants also challenged the DOL’s acceleration 
of the effective date of the 2011 Wage Rule from January 1, 
2012 to September 30, 2011.  The DOL’s later postponement 
of the effective date mooted those claims. 
 
12
  The District Court heard oral argument on June 28, 
2012, at which time the parties expressed doubt that the 
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Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Pa. 2012).  The District Court first 
rejected Appellants’ arguments regarding the DOL’s 
rulemaking authority, beginning with Appellants’ contention 
that the DHS unlawfully conditioned “its own granting of H-
2B visas on the receipt of labor certifications from the DOL” 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A).  Id. at 722.  
Instead, the District Court determined that: 
It was eminently reasonable for 
the DHS to do so because the 
DOL is uniquely qualified to 
provide advice about the potential 
effects of H-2B workers’ 
employment on United States 
workers, and because the DOL 
has been charged for decades with 
the responsibility of issuing labor 
certifications to employers 
seeking to hire temporary foreign 
workers.  
Id. at 724.  The District Court thus found that the DHS 
decision to adopt the DOL labor certification was entitled to 
deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Id. at 723–25.  
The District Court also noted that it “would have come to the 
same conclusion even under a less deferential, Skidmore-type 
standard of review.”  Id. at 725 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)). 
                                                                                                     
dispute over the 2011 Rule’s validity would be resolved by 
congressional action, i.e., funding for implementation of the 
Rule. 
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 The District Court then dismissed the argument that 
the DHS “improperly ‘offloaded’ some of its jurisdiction to 
the DOL by making the DOL a ‘co-determiner’ of H-2B visa 
petitions.”  Id. at 725.  The District Court explained: 
DHS takes the DOL’s advice on 
the labor certification question 
because DHS understands that the 
DOL has unrivaled expertise in 
this particular field.  But it is still 
just a “consultation,” which the 
INA expressly permits.   
This conclusion is bolstered by 
review of other cases in which an 
administrative agency has 
conditioned the exercise of its 
own authority on the decision of 
another entity. 
Id. at 725–26 (citing U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 
554, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).  The District Court likewise 
rejected the contention that “in enacting the INA, Congress 
unlawfully delegated its legislative power to the DOL by 
failing to lay down an ‘intelligible principle’ that 
‘meaningfully constrains’ DOL’s discretion.”  Id. at 726–27. 
Citing the history of the H-2B program, the statutory text of 
the INA, and the policy goals at issue, the District Court 
concluded that the INA, as amended by IRCA, confers 
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implied rulemaking authority on the DOL,
13
 and the DOL had 
not exceeded the scope of that authority in issuing the 2011 
Wage Rule.  Id. at 728–30.  Instead, “[t]he agencies’ 
interpretation of 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii) [as conferring 
rulemaking authority on the DOL] is not plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation” and “comports with the 
judicial preference for filling the interstices of the law 
through quasi-legislative enactment of rules of general 
applicability.”  Id. at 730.  Lastly, the District Court rejected 
Appellants’ claims that the DOL violated the APA and RFA 
when it promulgated the 2011 Wage Rule.  See id. at 732–38. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. §§ 611(a) and 704, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in a case brought 
under the APA de novo, “apply[ing] the applicable standard 
of review to the underlying agency decision.”  Cyberworld 
Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 195–96 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  Under the APA, we must set aside an agency 
action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law”; “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right”; or “without observance of procedure required by law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)–(D).  Appellants challenge both the 
DOL’s general rulemaking authority in the context of the H-
2B program, as well as its compliance with the requirements 
                                              
 
13
  The DOL conceded that it lacks express statutory 
authority to engage in such rulemaking.  See La. Forestry 
Ass’n, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
 29 
 
of the APA and the INA in promulgating the 2011 Wage 
Rule. 
A. 
  We turn first to Appellants’ claim that there exists no 
legal basis—statutory or otherwise—upon which the DOL 
may predicate its rulemaking concerning the H-2B program.
14
  
Appellants contend that the DHS unlawfully subdelegated its 
authority over the H-2B program to the DOL, and thus the 
District Court erred when it rejected this argument and found 
that the DHS lawfully conditioned its granting of H-2B visa 
petitions on labor certifications from the DOL.  According to 
the Departments, on the other hand, the DOL does not seek to 
justify its rulemaking in the H-2B context pursuant to a 
delegation theory.  Rather, the Departments assert that the 
DOL has authority to promulgate rules concerning the H-2B 
program because the DHS lawfully conditioned its granting 
of H-2B petitions on obtaining a labor certification from the 
DOL and permissibly endowed the DOL limited rulemaking 
                                              
 
14
  The Departments contend that Appellants never 
argued that the DOL lacks statutory authority to issue rules 
concerning the H-2B program during the administrative 
rulemaking proceedings, and thus the argument should be 
deemed waived for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.  We disagree.  Even if Appellants failed to 
challenge the DOL’s rulemaking authority on this ground 
during the administrative rulemaking process, the claim is not 
waived.  “[E]xhaustion of administrative remedies is not 
required when the issue involves only statutory construction, 
because there is no need for the administrative agency to 
develop a factual record or apply its expertise.”  Bradshaw v. 
Carlson, 682 F.3d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981).   
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authority to carry out its charge of issuing certifications.  For 
the reasons set forth below, we find that the DOL has 
authority to promulgate rules concerning the temporary labor 
certification process in the context of the H-2B program, and 
that the 2011 Wage Rule was validly promulgated pursuant to 
that authority.  This authority derives from regulation 
214.2(h)(6)(iii), which was promulgated pursuant to the 
DHS’s authority under sections 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) and 
1184(c) of the INA to administer the nation’s immigration 
laws, generally, and the H-2B program, specifically.  See 6 
U.S.C. §§ 202, 271(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c). 
1. 
 As an initial matter, we must resolve the parties’ 
dispute as to whether the DHS’s interpretation of the INA as 
permitting it to require H-2B petitioners to first obtain a 
temporary labor certification from the DOL is entitled to 
Chevron deference.  Appellants argue that the DHS’s 
interpretation of the governing statutory provisions is not 
entitled to deference under Chevron because the statutes—
and particularly section 1184(c)—do not contain ambiguous 
language.  The Departments and Intervenors, on the other 
hand, contend that Chevron deference is warranted because 
“Congress left a gap for DHS to fill when it charged DHS to 
consult with appropriate agencies,” and the “DHS’ 
interpretation of the gap as requiring a labor certification from 
the DOL is reasonable.”  Intervenors’ Br. at 37. 
  “[A]dministrative implementation of a particular 
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it 
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency 
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in 
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the exercise of that authority.”  United States v. Mead Corp., 
533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).  Here, Congress endowed the 
DHS with general authority to administer the nation’s 
immigration laws.  See 6 U.S.C. § 202.  With regard to the H-
2B program, Congress has specifically delegated to DHS the 
authority to “prescribe” by regulation the conditions under 
which aliens may be admitted to the United States, and the 
authority to “determine[]” H-2B petitions “after consultation 
with appropriate agencies of the Government.”  8 U.S.C. § 
1184(a), (c)(1).  Acting pursuant to this statutory authority, 
DHS has issued regulations of its own requiring employers 
seeking to admit workers under the H-2B program to first 
“apply for a temporary labor certification with the Secretary 
of Labor,” which certification “shall be advice to the director 
[of DHS] on whether or not United States workers capable of 
performing the temporary services or labor are available and 
whether or not the alien’s employment will adversely affect 
the wages and working conditions of similarly employed 
United States workers.”  8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A).  Thus, 
because “there is adequate indication of congressional intent 
in the statute to demonstrate substantial delegation of 
authority to the [DHS],” Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. 
Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2002), and because the 
DHS promulgated regulation 214.2 pursuant to that authority, 
“Chevron and its progeny provide the applicable standard of 
review.”  Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 191 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
2. 
 “Chevron established a familiar two-step procedure for 
evaluating whether an agency's interpretation of a statute is 
lawful.”  Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet 
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005).  The Supreme Court has 
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instructed that “[a]t the first step, we ask whether the statute’s 
plain terms ‘directly addres[s] the precise question at issue.’”  
Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).  “If the statute is 
ambiguous on the point, we defer at step two to the agency's 
interpretation so long as the construction is ‘a reasonable 
policy choice for the agency to make.’”  Id. (quoting 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845). 
a. 
 At the first step, the Supreme Court has instructed that 
we must consider not only the plain language of the statute, 
but also, through “traditional tools of statutory construction,” 
whether “Congress had an intention on the precise question at 
issue.”  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.  Section 1184(c) is 
silent as to the identity of the agencies with which the DHS 
may consult in fulfilling its charge to “determine[] . . . [t]he 
question of importing any alien as a nonimmigrant under [the 
H-2B program].”  8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1).  The statute likewise 
does not “directly addres[s] the precise question” of what 
constitutes permissible consultation.   Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. 
at 986 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843); see 8 U.S.C. § 
1101 (prescribing definitions for the INA and providing no 
definition for “consultation”).  We observe that, unlike in the 
context of the H-2A program, Congress did not specify the 
agency or agencies with which the DHS should consult in 
determining H-2B petitions.  Compare 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a), with id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b); see 
also id. § 1184(c)(1).  “[T]hat silence suggests . . . that the 
[DHS] has the discretion to fill the consequent statutory gap.”  
Nat’l Cable, 546 U.S. at 997.  We cannot glean any more 
understanding of Congress’ intention with respect to either 
question from the plain language of the statute read through 
“traditional tools of statutory construction.”  Chevron, 467 
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U.S. at 843 n.9; see United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 
293 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e no longer find it necessary to 
consider legislative history at Chevron step one.”).  
Accordingly, we conclude that the first step of the Chevron 
inquiry is satisfied. 
b. 
 We next consider whether the DHS’s construction of 
the INA is permissible, that is, whether it was “‘a reasonable 
policy choice for the agency to make.’”  Nat’l Cable, 545 
U.S. at 986 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845).  We find that 
it is. 
 We begin with Appellants’ contention that the DHS 
impermissibly interpreted the INA as allowing it to 
subdelegate its authority to administer the H-2B program to 
the DOL.  The precise question presented by this case is one 
of subdelegation, i.e., the transfer of authority from an agency 
endowed with authority pursuant to congressional enactment 
to entities within or outside of the agency itself.  As a general 
rule, “[w]hen a statute delegates authority to a federal officer 
or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer or 
agency is presumptively permissible absent affirmative 
evidence of a contrary congressional intent.”  U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565.  Our sister Courts of Appeals have 
recognized, however, “an important distinction between 
subdelegation to a subordinate and subdelegation to an 
outside party,” finding that “subdelegations to outside parties 
are assumed to be improper absent an affirmative showing of 
congressional authorization.”15  Id.; see also Fund for 
                                              
 
15
   Although the case law strongly suggests that the 
presumption of authority to subdelegate is inapplicable where 
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Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(“We agree with the D.C. Circuit that, absent statutory 
authorization, such delegation is impermissible.”).16   Under 
this line of reasoning, then, a subdelegation of authority from 
the DHS to the DOL—an outside, non-subordinate agency—
would be impermissible absent a clear statement from 
Congress authorizing such. 
 But the prohibition against subdelegation to an outside 
entity in the absence of express congressional authorization is 
applicable only if an agency actually delegated its power in 
the first place.  Thus, as a threshold matter, we must 
determine whether any delegation occurred at all.  “An 
agency delegates its authority when it shifts to another party 
almost the entire determination of whether a specific statutory 
requirement . . . has been satisfied, or where the agency 
abdicates its final reviewing authority.”  Kempthorne, 538 
F.3d at 133 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
                                                                                                     
an agency has attempted to delegate to a non-subordinate or 
outside entity, we need not decide this question today 
because, as discussed infra, the DHS’s actions were not, by 
definition, a delegation of authority.  
 
 
16
  As the D.C. Circuit has succinctly explained, 
“subdelegation to outside entities aggravates the risk of policy 
drift inherent in any principal-agent relationship” by blurring 
“lines of accountability”; “undermining an important 
democratic check on government decision-making”; and 
“increas[ing] the risk that these parties will not share the 
agency’s national vision and perspective.”  U.S. Telecom 
Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 565–66 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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In the case at bar, the authority delegated by Congress to the 
DHS under the INA “bears little resemblance to the far 
narrower band of discretion afforded to” the DOL under 
regulation 214.2.  Id.  The INA provides for the admission of 
aliens who have no intention of abandoning their foreign 
residence and intend to enter the United States to perform 
temporary work “if unemployed persons capable of 
performing such service or labor cannot be found in this 
country . . . .”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15(H)(ii)(b).  Congress has 
charged the DHS with administering the INA and 
“determin[ing] . . . [t]he question of importing any alien as a 
nonimmigrant under [the H2-B program] . . . after 
consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, 
upon petition of the importing employer.”  Id. § 1184(a), 
(c)(1).  Regulation 214.2, by contrast, requires employers 
seeking to admit workers under the H-2B program to first 
“apply for a temporary labor certification with the Secretary 
of Labor,” which “certification shall be advice to the director 
[of the DHS] on whether or not United States workers 
capable of performing the temporary services or labor are 
available and whether or not the alien’s employment will 
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of 
similarly employed United States workers.”  8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A).  Although the DHS’s decision to grant an 
H-2B petition depends, in part, on whether or not the DOL 
issues a temporary labor certification to the petitioner-
employer, it is the DHS—not the DOL—that must determine 
whether the other criteria for an H-2B visa have been 
satisfied.  For example, even if the DOL issues an employer a 
temporary labor certification, the DHS must still determine 
whether the alien intends to remain in the United States on a 
temporary basis and not abandon his or her foreign residence.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b); 2008 Wage Rule, 73 Fed. 
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Reg. at 78, 115 (explaining that after the DOL issues a 
temporary labor certification, “DHS reviews all of the 
necessary documentation that is required to be submitted with 
the petition,” and “may examine elements that are presented 
not only on the petition, but on the temporary labor 
certification as well for consistency such as stated wages, the 
nature of the job offered, the location, and other factors 
common to both petition and temporary labor certification”).  
Moreover, it is ultimately within the DHS’s discretion to 
grant or deny H-2B visa petitions after assessing whether the 
above-described requirements have been satisfied.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1); see also 2008 Wage Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 
at 78,115 (“While DHS will not go into the merits of the 
determination previously made by DOL, DHS is responsible 
for ensuring the integrity of the H-2B program, that the facts 
presented in the entire petition package are true and 
verifiable.”).  
 Regulation 214.2 therefore does not effect a delegation 
of authority, but instead provides for a type of “legitimate 
outside party input into agency decision-making processes.”  
U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 566.  Our sister Courts of 
Appeals have recognized three such types of permissible 
assistance: “(1) establishing a reasonable condition for 
granting federal approval; (2) fact gathering; and (3) advice 
giving.”  Id.  The scheme established under regulation 214.2 
fits the first of these models.  By adopting a rule that requires 
H-2B employers to first obtain a temporary labor certification 
from the DOL on the questions of whether there are U.S. 
workers capable of performing the job in question and the 
impact of the aliens’ employment on U.S. workers, and 
giving the DOL discretion to issue a limited set of rules 
governing the certification process, the DHS was exercising 
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its broad authority to “determine” the specific “question of 
importing any alien” under the H-2B visa program.  8 U.S.C. 
§1184(a), (c).  The DHS thus did not impermissibly 
subdelegate all of its authority in this area.  Rather, the DHS 
conditioned its own granting of an H-2B petition on the 
DOL’s grant of a temporary labor certification.   
 Where Congress has entrusted a federal agency with 
broad discretion to permit or forbid certain activities, we will 
uphold the agency’s conditioning of its “grant of permission 
on the decision of another entity, such as a state, local, or 
tribal government, so long as there is a reasonable connection 
between the outside agency’s decision and the federal 
agency’s determination.”  U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 
567.  Here, Congress has charged the DHS with determining 
whether or not to grant H-2B visa petitions.  See 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 1184(c).  As part of that determination, 
the DHS must consider whether there are United States 
citizens willing to perform the job for which an H-2B visa is 
sought.  See id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).  The DHS has been 
further instructed pursuant to section 1184(c) of the INA to 
“consult[]” with “appropriate agencies of the Government” in 
making H-2B visa determinations.  Id. § 1184(c)(1).  The 
INA does not define what constitutes “consultation,” nor does 
it specify the agencies with which the DHS may (or may not) 
consult in administering the H-2B program.  See id. §§ 1101, 
1184(c)(1). 
 We find that there is a “reasonable connection” 
between the DHS’s determination of H-2B petitions and the 
DOL’s decisions on temporary labor certifications in light of 
the statute’s silence as to what constitutes permissible 
“consultation” and the specific agencies with which the DHS 
may consult in making H-2B visa determinations.  U.S. 
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Telecom Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 567.  This is especially so in 
consideration of the DOL’s institutional expertise in labor and 
employment matters, as well as the Department’s history of 
rulemaking authority in the context of the H-2B program.  
The DOL has been involved in the administration of the 
nation’s immigration laws since its inception in 1913, and for 
the past six decades, has provided temporary labor 
certifications in some form to the government agency charged 
with administering the nation’s immigration laws concerning 
admission of temporary non-agricultural workers.  See La. 
Forestry Ass’n, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 716 n.2.  Beginning in the 
1960s, the DOL provided certifications to INS at INS’s 
request.  See 31 Fed. Reg. at 4,446 (INS regulation requiring 
H-2B petitioners to first obtain a “certification from the 
Secretary of Labor . . . stating that qualified persons in the 
United States are not available . . . .”); 31 Fed. Reg. at 11,744 
(same); 33 Fed. Reg. at 7,570 (1968 DOL regulation 
governing the certification process); 43 Fed. Reg. at 10,306 
(1978 regulation concerning the same); Gen. Admin. Ltr., No. 
4-95; Gen. Admin. Ltr., No. 2-98.  In 2002, when authority to 
administer the INA was transferred to the DHS, the DOL 
continued its role of providing temporary labor certifications 
and advice about the availability of U.S. workers for H-2B 
jobs and the effect of H-2B workers’ employment on U.S. 
workers’ wages.  See La. Forestry Ass’n, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 
717; 2008 Wage Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 78,020.   
 It was likewise reasonable for the DHS to adopt a 
regulatory provision allowing the DOL to promulgate a 
narrow class of rules governing the temporary labor 
certification process.  Without the ability to establish 
procedures to administer the temporary labor certification 
process, the DOL would not be able to fulfill the consulting 
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role defined by DHS’s charge to the DOL to issue temporary 
labor certifications.  The DHS afforded DOL only as much 
rulemaking authority as needed to carry out its consultative 
role by issuing temporary labor certifications.  Furthermore, 
as noted above, the DOL has institutional expertise in matters 
concerning U.S. employment, and a long and extensive 
history of issuing temporary labor certifications for non-
agricultural jobs and making limited rules to structure the 
issuance of such certifications.  Thus, there is a “reasonable 
connection” between the DOL’s limited rulemaking authority 
and the DHS’s determination of H-2B visa petitions.  U.S. 
Telecom. Ass’n, 359 F.3d at 567.   
 We further note that Congress is and has been aware of 
the DOL’s involvement in the administration of the H-2B visa 
program for several decades, and yet, despite several 
opportunities to do so, has never amended the INA to prohibit 
the DOL’s involvement in the H-2B program or to specify 
which agencies are the “appropriate” ones with which the 
DHS may consult in exercising its authority to grant or deny 
H-2B visas.  For example, when it bifurcated the H-2 
program to create the H-2A and H-2B programs, Congress 
specifically named the DOL as the agency with which the 
DHS must consult in administering the H-2A program. See 
IRCA § 301(b) (“8 U.S.C. § 1184(c) is amended by adding at 
the end of the following: ‘For purposes of this subsection 
with respect to nonimmigrants described in section 
101(a)(14)(H)(ii)(a), the term ‘appropriate agencies of 
Government’ means the Department of Labor . . . .’”).  
However, Congress was silent as to which agencies, 
specifically, the DHS may “consult[]” with in its 
administration of the H-2B program, choosing broad 
language—“appropriate agencies,” 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)—and 
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thus affording the DHS greater discretion with respect to the 
agencies with which it may consult concerning the H-2B 
program.  See Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 
607, 616 (1944) (“[W]hen Congress wants to give wide 
discretion it uses broad language.”). 
 Nor did Congress enact any changes to the H-2B 
program after the Supreme Court’s decision in Alfred L. 
Snapp & Son, Inc., v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982), 
where the Court recognized that the DOL promulgates rules 
concerning the H-2B program, despite enacting amendments 
to the INA in both 2005 and 2011.  “The normal rule of 
statutory construction is that if Congress intends for 
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created 
concept, it makes that intent specific.”  Midatlantic Nat’l 
Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986).  
If, in fact, Congress did not intend to allow the DHS to 
consult with the DOL in this manner when it enacted section 
1184(c)(1), then Congress may amend the INA accordingly.  
Where, however, an agency reasonably construes a statute 
endowing it with broad authority, we must defer to that 
interpretation, and “the remedy, if any is indicated, is for 
congressional, and not judicial, action.”  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 
U.S. 258, 285 (1972).  
 We thus reject Appellants’ contention that the 2011 
Wage Rule was promulgated pursuant to an unlawful 
subdelegation of the DHS’s authority to administer the H-2B 
program.  We hold, instead, that the 2011 Wage Rule was 
issued pursuant to the DHS’s permissible “conditioning” of 
the grant of H-2B petitions on the advice of the DOL pursuant 
to the DHS’s charge from Congress to “determine[]” H-2B 
visa petitions “after consultation with appropriate agencies of 
the Government.”  8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(1).  Because we find 
 41 
 
that the 2011 Wage Rule was promulgated pursuant to a 
permissible conditioning of the DHS’s granting of H-2B 
petitions on a decision by the DOL and the limited 
rulemaking authority the DOL has to carry out that charge, 
we need not decide today whether, as the Departments 
contend and Appellants vigorously contest, the DOL has 
express or implied statutory authority under the WPA or INA 
to promulgate rules concerning the H-2B program.  See 
Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 49 F.3d 982, 992 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“It is well settled law that in general [c]ases are to be 
decided on the narrowest legal grounds available, and relief is 
to be tailored carefully to the nature of the dispute before the 
court.”) (quotation marks omitted).  We leave that question, 
which remains open in this Circuit, for another day, and hold 
only that the 2011 Wage Rule was lawfully promulgated 
pursuant to a reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision 
charging the DHS with administration of the H-2B program.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1184.  Our decision is completed by the 
principles of deference governing our review on appeal.
17
  See 
                                              
 
17
  We acknowledge that the decision we reach today is 
a difficult one, especially because the result we reach may 
potentially create a split between our Court and the Eleventh 
Circuit.  In a recent review of a preliminary injunction of the 
2011 Wage Rule, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the DOL’s 
argument that it has rulemaking authority in the context of the 
H-2B program pursuant to a lawful conditioning by DHS of 
its authority to grant or deny H-2B visa petitions.  See Bayou 
Lawn & Landscape Servs. v. Sec. of Labor, 713 F.3d 1080 
(11th Cir. 2013). 
 
  Our decision in this case is “influence[d] by the policy 
consideration that circuit splits, especially in the circumstance 
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of this case in which national uniformity of a single rule is of 
vital importance, are to be avoided.”  Sam L. Majors Jewelers 
v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922, 929 n.16 (5th Cir. 1997).  We thus 
emphasize that under the governing standards of review, and 
in consideration of the important principles of separation of 
powers that guide our review of agency action, we feel bound 
to defer to the DHS’s interpretation of the statutes under 
which Congress has authorized it to administer the H-2B 
program.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.  We reiterate that 
should Congress disagree with this construction of the INA, 
Congress may take action to amend the statute accordingly.  
We further note that the procedural posture of Bayou—an 
appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction, rather than 
from a final judgment—means that the Bayou Court’s 
decision is not the final word from the Eleventh Circuit on the 
question of the DOL’s general rulemaking authority.  The 
three-member panel in Bayou opined only on whether the 
District Court abused its discretion in finding that the 
employer-plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of 
their challenge to the DOL’s rulemaking authority, not on 
whether the DOL actually has that authority or not.  See 
Bayou, 713 F.3d at 1085; Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96, 
104 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t is well established that . . . a panel 
hearing an appeal from the entry of a final judgment [is not 
required] to follow the legal analysis contained in a prior 
panel decision addressing the question of whether a party that 
moved for preliminary injunctive relief showed a likelihood 
of success on the merits.”).  A circuit split is thus not yet a 
foregone conclusion.   
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Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro Twp., 431 U.S. 85, 98 
(1977).   
B. 
 Having determined that the DOL has authority to 
engage in rulemaking concerning the H-2B program, we turn 
to Appellants’ argument that even if the DOL has general 
rulemaking authority, it exceeded that authority when issuing 
the 2011 Wage Rule.  Appellants present several procedural 
and substantive challenges under the APA and INA, 
respectively.  We address each in turn. 
1. 
 The 2011 Wage Rule was promulgated pursuant to the 
informal rulemaking procedures of section 553 of the APA.  
See 5 U.S.C. § 553.  “The agency’s action in promulgating 
such standards therefore may be set aside if found to be 
‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 
in accordance with law.’”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 
Inc. v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 
(1983) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).  “A court may 
conclude that a regulation is arbitrary and capricious only if 
the agency relied on facts other than those intended by 
Congress, did not consider an important aspect of the issue 
confronting the agency, provided an explanation for its 
decision which runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is entirely implausible.”  Gardner v. Grandolsky, 
585 F.3d 786, 790 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).  
Although our “inquiry into the facts is to be searching and 
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.”  
Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
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(1971).  We are “not empowered to substitute [our] judgment 
for that of the agency.”  Id.  
a. 
 Appellants first argue that the DOL failed to comply 
with section 553 of the APA, which requires that an agency 
publish general notice of a proposed rule in the Federal 
Register and include in that notice “reference to the legal 
authority under which the rule is proposed,” and “either the 
terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(2)&(3).  
The purpose of “[s]ection 553 [is] . . . to give the public an 
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process,” and to 
“enable[] the agency promulgating the rule to educate itself 
before establishing rules and procedures which have a 
substantial impact on those regulated.”  Am. Iron & Steel Inst. 
v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 291 (3d Cir. 1977).  Thus, in 
evaluating an argument that an agency failed to satisfy the 
requirements of section 553, we ultimately “must determine 
whether the notice given was sufficient to fairly apprise 
interested parties of all significant subjects and issues 
involved.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 We disagree with Appellants that the DOL failed to 
adequately explain the legal basis for, or purpose of, the 2011 
Wage Rule.  The DOL expressly identified 8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(6) as “the legal basis for the proposed rule” in a 
section of the NPRM entitled “Succinct Statement of the 
Objectives of, and Legal Basis for, the Proposed Rule.”  
Proposed 2011 Wage Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 61,584.  
Furthermore, as the District Court correctly observed, the 
DOL also identified sections 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(B) and 
1184(c)(1) of the INA as bases for its authority to issue the 
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2011 Wage Rule.
18
  In the NPRM, the DOL explained that the 
DHS is charged with administering the H-2B program 
pursuant to section 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) of the INA, and that  
[s]ection 214(c)(1) of the INA 
requires DHS to consult with 
appropriate agencies before 
approving an H-2B visa petition.  
The regulations [8 C.F.R. § 
214.2(h)(6)] for U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services 
(USCIS), the agency within DHS 
which adjudicates requests for H-
2B status, require that an 
intending employer first apply for 
a temporary labor certification 
from the Secretary of Labor. 
Id. at 61,578.  The DOL also thoroughly explained the need 
for the 2011 Wage Rule and identified the purpose of the 
Rule.  In a subsection entitled “The Need for New 
Rulemaking,” the DOL explained:  
[T]he Department ha[d] grown 
increasingly concerned that the 
current calculation method does 
                                              
 
18
  The fact that the DOL identified these provisions of 
the INA as bases for the 2011 Wage Rule in a separate 
section of the NPRM from that in which it cited regulation 
214.2 is of no import, as “[t]he APA does not require that the 
proposed rule cite the relevant legal authority in a certain 
location.”  United States v. Stevenson, 676 F.3d 557, 563 (6th 
Cir. 2012).   
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not adequately reflect the 
appropriate wage necessary to 
ensure U.S. workers are not 
adversely affected by the 
employment of H-2b workers.  
Additionally, the prevailing wage 
calculation methodology became 
the subject of litigation. . . . 
Accordingly, in order to comply 
with the Court’s order and to 
appropriately establish a wage 
methodology that adequately 
protects U.S. and H-2B workers, 
the Department is engaging in this 
new rulemaking . . . . 
Id. at 61,579; see also 75 Fed. Reg. at 61,584 (subsection 
entitled “Description of the Reasons That Action by the 
Agency Is Being Considered”).  These statements “would 
fairly apprise interested persons of the subjects and issues 
before the [DOL],” and, more specifically, of the legal basis 
and purpose of the proposed rule.  Am. Iron & Steel Inst., 568 
F.2d at 293.  Accordingly, we agree with the District Court 
that the DOL “provided sufficiently detailed notice to the 
public of the DOL’s authority” as required by section 553(b).  
La. Forestry Ass’n, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 732.   
b. 
 Appellants next argue that the DOL failed to consider 
employer interests or hardship and improperly established 
wages to attract U.S. workers in promulgating the 2011 Wage 
Rule.  Appellants further contend that the DOL failed to 
provide an adequate “reasoned analysis” in support of the 
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Rule.  Appellants’ Br. at 65.  Failure to consider relevant 
factors or provide an adequate explanation for an agency 
action are indeed among the “wide range of reasons why 
agency action may be judicially branded as ‘arbitrary and 
capricious.’”  FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 
1986).  We find, however, that the DOL satisfied both of 
these requirements, “neither [of which] is particularly 
demanding.”  Pub. Citizen, 988 F.2d at 197.   
 First, as to the requirement that an agency consider 
factors relevant to the rule in question, the APA requires only 
that an agency “demonstrate that it has considered the 
relevant factors brought to its attention by interested parties 
during the course of the rulemaking, and that it has made a 
reasoned choice among the various alternatives presented.”  
Nat’l Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 700 (3d 
Cir. 1979).  The DOL did so in this case.  With respect to 
employer interests and hardship, the DOL considered the 
effect of the 2011 Wage Rule’s wage methodology on 
employers, namely, that it would potentially result in 
employers experiencing higher-than-anticipated labor costs.  
See 2011 Wage Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 3,462.  Directly in 
response to comments expressing concern that “the 
Department did not take into account contracts employers 
have already put in place for the coming year,” the DOL 
concluded that “[t]he fact that a new wage methodology may 
result in wages in excess of anticipated labor costs does not 
minimize the Department’s obligation” to provide for 
calculation of a prevailing wage rate that does not have an 
adverse impact on the wages of similarly-employed U.S. 
workers.  Id.  In any event, the DOL is not required to 
consider employer hardship under the statutory and regulatory 
framework from which its authority to issue labor 
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certifications derives.  The DOL must, instead, balance the 
interests of “assur[ing] an adequate labor force on the one 
hand and . . . protect[ing] the jobs of citizens on the other.”19  
Rogers, 563 F.2d at 626; see 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iii)(A); see also 
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 596.  The DOL satisfied its obligations 
under the APA by “respond[ing] to relevant and significant 
public comments” concerning factors relevant to the 2011 
Wage Rule and “adequately explaining its result.”  Pub. 
Citizen, 988 F.2d at 197.   
 We likewise reject Appellants’ argument that the DOL 
improperly established wage rates in order to attract U.S. 
workers—a factor Appellants claim the DOL was prohibited 
from considering in promulgating the 2011 Wage Rule.  
According to Appellants, in the NPRM and notice 
accompanying the final rule, the DOL “discussed the effect of 
higher wage rates on employers’ ability to attract U.S. 
workers,” a “factor that Congress and the [DHS] precluded 
from consideration.”  Appellants’ Br. at 60–61.  We cannot 
agree.  The INA and DHS regulatory provisions governing 
the DOL’s issuance of labor certifications require the DOL to 
consider, in issuing a temporary labor certification, whether 
H-2B alien workers’ employment “will adversely affect the 
                                              
 
19
  Indeed, the District Court in the CATA litigation 
expressly found that the DOL was prohibited from 
considering employer hardship in setting the prevailing wage 
rate.  See CATA II, 2011 WL 2414555, at *4.  One may well 
question that conclusion, since an employer's hardship can 
certainly be relevant to the goal of protecting citizens' jobs, 
but that issue is not before us in this appeal and we thus 
express no further comment on the propriety of that holding.   
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wages and working conditions of similarly employed United 
States workers,” 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(6)(iii), a requirement that 
derives from the DHS’s charge from Congress to consider 
whether H-2B workers will have an “adverse effect” on U.S. 
workers.  8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), 1184(c)(1).  The 
DOL’s statements concerning the proposed methodology’s 
potential to “attract” U.S. workers to which Appellants object 
were made in the course of its discussion of whether the 
proposed wage methodology would “adversely affect[] the 
wages of U.S. workers in those same jobs,” and in the 
Department’s economic analysis of the effect of the Rule—an 
analysis required by Executive Order 12866.  See Proposed 
2011 Wage Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 61,581 n.3; 2011 Wage Rule, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 3,454; 75 Fed. Reg. at 61,583; 76 Fed. Reg. 
3,470.  Thus it was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the 
DOL to include in the NPRM and final rule an analysis and 
discussion of the effects that the 2011 Wage Rule’s wage 
calculation methodology might have on U.S. workers.   
 We likewise hold that the DOL provided the “reasoned 
analysis supported by the evidence” required by the APA.  
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 462 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Appellants’ challenge to the DOL’s compliance with 
this requirement focuses on the DOL’s purported failure to 
respond to public comments “criti[cizing] DOL for adopting 
diverse wage data sources and urg[ing] DOL to ‘show its 
work’ to corroborate that the various methodologies were 
mutually validating . . . .”  Appellants’ Br. at 66.  Appellants 
also take issue with the DOL’s purported disregard of public 
comments “urg[ing] DOL to make a more expansive view 
[of] . . . adverse impact on other American co-workers.”  Id. 
at 67. 
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 It is well established, however, that an “agency need 
not address every comment” it receives.  City of Waukesha v. 
EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  The APA requires 
only that the NPRM show the court “what major issues of 
policy were ventilated by the informal procedures and why 
the agency reacted to them as it did.”  Auto. Parts & 
Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 
1968).  The DOL responded to comments concerning a 
variety of topics related to the Proposed 2011 Wage Rule, 
devoting an entire section of the final rule to discussing the 
300 comments submitted.  See 2011 Wage Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 3,454–3,468.  For example, the DOL responded to 
comments concerning the ability of employers to find U.S. 
workers interested in H-2B job opportunities; the propriety of 
the wage methodology adopted, including use of SCA or 
DBA wage data and the elimination of the four-tier wage 
method; and the alleged error in the data the Department used 
to measure the effect of the H-2B wage methodology on 
wages.  See id. at 3,454–3,463.  The DOL also discussed 
comments proposing alternative methods for calculating the 
prevailing wage rule and explained why it rejected these 
alternatives.  See id. at 3,463–3,468.  In responding to the 
comments, and in the discussion portion of the notice 
accompanying the final rule, the DOL “examine[d] the 
relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for 
its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.’”  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 
156, 168 (1962)); see 2011 Wage Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 
3,452–3,468.  This is all that the APA requires. 
  Accordingly, the DOL did not act arbitrarily and 
capriciously in contravention of the procedural requirements 
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of the APA, and the 2011 Wage Rule is not invalid on that 
ground.  
2. 
 Finally, we turn to Appellants’ substantive challenge 
to the 2011 Wage Rule.  Appellants contend that section 
1182(p)(4) of the INA required the DOL to use the four-tier 
wage methodology from the H-1B program as the prevailing 
wage calculation mechanism in the H-2B program and erred 
by eliminating the four-tier structure from the wage 
calculation regime.  Under section 706 of the APA, we must 
set aside an agency action that is “in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory 
right.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).  This inquiry “necessarily 
entails a firsthand judicial comparison of the claimed 
excessive action with the pertinent statutory authority.”  W. 
Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 541 F.2d 346, 354 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 Section 1182(p)(4) provides: 
Where the Secretary of Labor 
uses, or makes available to 
employers, a governmental survey 
to determine the prevailing wage, 
such survey shall provide at least 
4 levels of wages commensurate 
with experience, education, and 
the level of supervision.  Where 
an existing government survey 
has only 2 levels, 2 intermediate 
levels may be created by dividing 
by 3, the difference between the 2 
levels offered, adding the quotient 
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thus obtained to the first level and 
subtracting that quotient from the 
second level. 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(p)(4) (2012).  We acknowledge that this 
statement, taken alone and out of context, suggests that the 
four-tier methodology should be used in making prevailing 
wage determinations.  But therein lies the problem with 
Appellants’ argument: it is taken entirely out of context, with 
no reference to the section or subsection within which it is 
was enacted.  Indeed, it is axiomatic that “the proper reading 
of a statute must take account of words in the context of the 
entire statute.”  United States v. Atiyeh, 402 F.3d 354, 366 (3d 
Cir. 2005); see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“The meaning—or 
ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become 
evident when placed in context.”).   
 We therefore turn to the statutory context of section 
1182(p)(4), which was enacted as part of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act of 2005, and, more specifically, pursuant 
to the Title IV, “Visa Reform,” sub-section 423, the “L-1 
Visa and H-1B Visa Reform Act.”  See Pub. L. No. 108-447, 
div. J., tit. IV, § 423, 118 Stat. 2809, 3353–54 (2004).  The 
short title of the section under which section 1182(p)(4) was 
enacted is “H-1B Prevailing Wage Level.”  Id.  Indeed, as its 
title would suggest, the L-1 Visa and H-1B Visa Reform Act 
amended only provisions of U.S. immigration statutes dealing 
with the L-1 and H-1B visa programs—the H-2B program is 
not mentioned once in the Act.  See generally id.  Read in this 
context, it is abundantly clear that section 1182(p)(4)’s 
requirement that the DOL use the four-tier methodology 
applies only to the H-1B program.  We therefore conclude 
that the DOL did not act “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
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authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right” in 
eliminating the four-tier scheme from the 2011 Wage Rule.
20
  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).  Accordingly, we reject Appellants’ 
argument that the 2011 Wage Rule violates the requirements 
of the INA.
21
   
                                              
 
20
  Because we find that the statute is unambiguous, we 
reject the Departments’ and Intervenors’ assertion that 
Chevron deference is warranted.  See Nat’l Cable, 545 U.S. at 
982 (noting that Chevron deference is warranted only if the 
court first finds that the statute is ambiguous).  
 
 
21
  We likewise reject Appellants’ argument that the 
DOL violated the APA when it issued the April 2011 NPRM 
in which it, among other things, modified the H-2B program 
certification form, finding, as the District Court did, that 
Appellants waived this argument.  See La. Forestry Ass’n, 
889 F. Supp. 2d at 737 n.19.  We have carefully reviewed the 
record—taking steps to obtain a complete copy of the 
complaint, rather than the truncated version reproduced in the 
Joint Appendix—and conclude that the claim was raised for 
the first time only in pretrial memoranda and was not, as 
Appellants claim, “prominently stated in the Complaint.”  
Appellants Br. at 61.  Compare J.A. 407-24, with D.C. 
Docket, No. 1-11-cv-01623-DDD-JDK, No. 1 (W.D. La. 
Sept. 19, 2011).  Indeed, the April 2011 notice, 76 Fed. Reg. 
21,036, is not cited one time in the Complaint.  See D.C. 
Docket, No. 1-11-cv-01623-DDD-JDK, No. 1.  Nor did 
Appellants move to amend the Complaint to include a 
challenge to the April 2011 notice.  Accordingly, the claim is 
waived.  See Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 
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III. 
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
632, 641-42 (3d Cir. 1993); Zimmerman v. PepsiCo., Inc., 
836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988).   
